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1 Introduction 
The evolution of Zimbabwe's economic problems and policies since 1980 both encapsulates 
the post-colonial experiences of many African countries and also reflects changing views in 
wider debates amongst academics and policy makers. In this paper, I wish to review that 
evolution, focusing particularly on the issue of health-care provision, with a view to casting 
some light on issues in the wider debate. 
My main argument is that there has been a decline in the factors determining health, and 
probably in health status, since 1990 and that the proximate cause of this is the 
implementation of ESAP; however, there were many signs of deterioration prior to ESAP, 
suggesting that there may be long term structural problems; these I locate in the political 
sphere and argue that neither ESAP nor pre-ESAP approaches to economic and health 
policy address these problems. I also argue that many of the critics of ESAP make the same 
mistake. 
2 Some Prelimimry Considerations 
a) Structural Adjustment Programmes 
Structural adjustment programmes evolved out of earlier and narrower macroeconomic 
stabilization policies. These were designed for countries with fundamental balance of 
payments problems. They focused on a range of policies concerned with both reducing 
domestic aggregate demand and switching it away from tradable goods: depreciating the 
exchange rate and restricting the expansion of domestic credit, particularly to the public 
sector, were the two main instruments. The latter entailed cutting government budget 
deficits, normally by cutting expenditure, especially on social services and subsidies. 
Experience and theoretical criticism showed that these policies ignored the supply side of 
the story and were too short-term in their horizons. Thus, while structural adjustment 
programmes still contain short-run stabilization measures and are motivated by balance of 
payments deficits, they also contain a broader range of measures intended to improve 
domestic supply incentives particularly for the production of tradable goods: decontrol of 
prices, removal of quantitative restrictions on trade and reduction in trade barriers 
generally, deregulation of interest rates, commericalization and/or privatization of 
parastatals. Some of the measures used earlier in stabilization programmes are now seen to 
be more important for their supply consequences than for their original demand 
management purposes. Most of the progrdmmes are associated with the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund because they are initiated with balance of payments crises 
which require short term external financing, and because the programmes themselves 
require external capital to avoid short-term supply bottlenecks. 
The critics of SAPS fall along a continuum. First are those who, while accepting the 
underlying premises of orthodoxy, argue that the design and implementation of the 
programmes impose high short run costs on "vulnerable groups". These costs arise because 
the measures are inflationary in the short-run (devaluation coupled with import 
dependence and removal of price controls causes cost push inflation) and because some of 
the cost cutting measures have an adverse direct impact on the poor (removal of subsidies 
on basic goods, the introduction of fees for many previously free public services) and raise 
prices directly. Programmes can be designed (particularly by phasing them over longer 
periods) so that, while still satisfying their primary economic objectives, they minimize short- 
run costs. Where even these minimal costs are unacceptable, they should include measures 
to mitigate the impact of these costs on vulnerable groups.2 The multilateral financial 
institutions have partially accepted this set of criticisms, with a growing concern for social 
costs of adjustment, although some critics point out that measures taken have not in 
practice significantly protected the poor. 
Critics have also pointed out that even when judged by their own standards, SAPs have not 
been successful. Greenaway and Morrissey citing other studies find that the effect on the 
current account balance is probably positive; on GDP growth is unclear but is at best 
modest; and on investment is negative (Greenaway and Morrissey, 1992). The problem with 
judging the outcome of the programmes is that in principle the appropriate benchmark is 
what would have happened to the economy in the absence of the programmes. If the pre- 
adjustment economy was in some sense unsustainable, then it is not appropriate to argue 
that the programme is responsible for the deterioration. 
A second set of opponents argue that the agenda of SAPs is to raise the importance of 
"market forces" and to re-integrate SSA into the world economic system.3 In fact there is 
little disagreement between these critics and the proponents of SAPs that this is indeed the 
aim; rather they disagree as to whether the achievement of this aim would be beneficial in 
development terms. In other words there is disagreement about the underlying development 
paradigm. These critics argue that the effect of SAPs is to retard - if not to block completely - 
the economic development of SSA. Measures to mitigate short run social costs are thus 
beside the point, since there are no long run benefits. Indeed, trying to soften the short-run 
costs is detrimental to their solution, since they soften the opposition to the global system 
which needs to be changed if there are to be any prospects of really solving the question of 
poverty. These opponents would argue that the first set of reformist critics do not face up to 
the fact that it is the international capitalist world system which is at the base of 
underdevelopment, and until that is tackled there is no prospect of permanently and 
significantly mitigating the lives of the poor in the third world. 
This criticism has been voiced in Zimbabwe. For example, MacGarry, in his paper on ESAP 
and the economy. writes: 
ESAP, as imposed on country after country around the world, is designed to support a 
new 'global division of labour'. with the already developed countries supplying all the 
manufactured goods the poorer countries of the South need, while those countries try 
to pay for the imports, and pay their debts, by selling food and other raw materials to 
the rich. The IMFIWorld Bank master plan has no place in it for the development of 
manufacturing industry in countries like Zimbabwe, so it would not be realistic to look 
to an adjustment programme designed according to their principles to serve our 
industrialization. It is more likely that spme of our advanced industrial firms, such as 
ZISCO, may have to close and such machine components as we now manufacture for 
ourselves will need to be imported; we might still be allowed to assemble machinery 
from imported parts. (MacGarry, 1993: 3 1 ) 
The contrast between these two critiques captures the dilemma of the conflict between the 
short-run amelioration of the lives of the poor and the longer-run creation of a better 
system. It is clear that the longer-term radical solution does not address the short-run 
problem; however, short-run amelioration may undermine the attainment of the long-run 
solution. 
b) The Determinants of Good Health: "Inside" and "Outside" Factors 
The connection between the economy, health-care provision and health status has been 
widely examined (see for example Kim [ 19921). These studies suggest that the link is complex 
and difficult to quantify. It is useful to distinguish between those factors inside the health 
service sector (building of hospitals and clinics, the training of doctors, nurses and other 
medical personnel, the provision of drugs, immunization, health education programmes) 
and those outside it (the economic situation including income levels and distribution which 
is probably the most important, education, environmental context, etc.). Outside factors 
feed into the "health production function" directly (e.g. higher incomes improve nutritional 
status) and indirectly (through the provision of health-care services and by affecting the 
use made of those services). Outside factors are significantly more important than inside 
factors. 
These different channels are important to understand for the health and adjustment debate. 
Adjustment is often seen as having a negative effect on health status because public 
provision of health services is often cut in attempts to reduce government expenditure, i.e. 
through their effects on the inside factors. However, proponents argue that to the extent 
that health expenditures contribute to macro-economic constraints on growth, they reduce 
the rate at which outside influences can improve. Critics point to the collapse in incomes 
which often occurs with the introduction of the SAP. This affects health status because 
increasing poverty directly makes people sicker and poor people use health services less. 
Proponents argue that the decline in real incomes is transitory and that in the longer run, 
unadjusted economies harm health more because they will have lower growth rates. This 
argument depends on the impact of adjustment on long-term growth. Even if long-term 
growth rates of adjusted economies are higher than those of unadjusted ones - and there is 
little clear evidence to suggest they are - the difference would have to be large to be justified 
in cost-benefit terms if there is a significant short-term deterioration of living standards. If 
one takes the view that intergenerational comparisons of utility are not possible, even the 
prospect of substantial future gains would not justify large "transitional" costs. 
SAPS have a differential impact on women. With shrinking formal employment, women are 
more at risk than men. Furthermore, the concentration of women in the informal sector 
means that in times of hardship women's incomes decline. If they lose their jobs, there is a 
differential impact on the intra-household distribution of income, which can significantly 
affect child nutrition. Additionally, the burden of coping with adjustment in the household 
generally falls disproportionately on women: more of their time is spent seeking ways to 
stretch the shrinking budget, cope with sick children who can no longer be taken to health 
care institutions, etc. In the longer run, introduction of fees in education tends to lead - 
and there is evidence that this has happened in Zimbabwe - to higher drop-out rates for 
girls; given the well-established link between female education, health and fertility, the 
consequences of this are likely to be negative. 
3 Economic Performance and Health in Zimbabwe since 1980 
a) Outside Factors: Economic Performance 1980-1 994 
At Independence in 1980, Zimbabwe's government proclaimed "transition to socialism" as its 
goal.5 Welfare measures designed to redress inherited inequalities were introduced: national 
minimum wages, rapid expansion of education, free health-care services for low income 
earners, improved rural credit facilities, a (limited) land resettlement programme, expanded 
government programmes on water, sanitation and drought relief. It also used a range of 
policy instruments and institutions - many inherited. Extensive price controls were used to 
protect low income groups from inflation in basic wage goods; this entailed subsidizing basic 
foodstuffs. The Grain Marketing Board and the Agricultural Finance Corporation were used 
to extend services and to channel credit to small scale agricultural producers. New 
parastatals were introduced to give the state more control over private businesses. 
The budgetary implications of these programmes were accommodated initially by the 
economic growth (stimulated by relaxation of sanctions, import expansion and good 
agricultural seasons) around independence. However, growing balance of payments deficits 
led to the adoption of stabilization measures in 1983: an IMF Stand-by Credit in 1983184; 
minimum wage legislation began to be used to curtail wage costs; an active exchange rate 
policy was adopted, although quantitative import controls remained the central instrument 
for current account management. 
Central to this story was the government budget deficit. Government attempted to sustain 
its social programmes. Expenditure cuts were made, but on capital rather than recurrent 
expenditure. It was thus difficult to avoid a growing budget deficit. Simultaneously 
government approached foreign debt prudently, using direct foreign exchange controls to 
bring the current account deficit into surplus. This combination of a high public-sector 
deficit and low foreign savings could only be accommodated through a high private-sector 
surplus, which was achieved through compression of consumption and investment in the 
private sector - induced by a combination of import, wage and price controls and by 
financial crowding out (Davies and Rattso, 1993). 
Through the eighties it was recognized that lack of foreign exchange constrained growth 
and various ad hoc measures were introduced to stimulate exports while retaining the 
quantitative controls on imports. Although these programmes achieved some success 
(replicating policies successfully used in Korea), pressure built up from various quarters for a 
more systematic revision of economic policy. With hindsight, the experiments with various 
ad hoc macro economic and trade policies can be seen as  constituting an unevenly paced 
evolution towards the more systematic adjustment programme adopted in 1990 (Shaw and 
Davies, 199 1 ). 
Table 1 summarizes some relevant economic performance indicators for the 1980s. As Row 5 
shows, after an initial increase, per capita income was relatively stagnant. Real average 
earnings in the formal sector (Row 8) were more than 5 per cent lower in 1990 than they 
had been in 1982. We do not have good measures of how income distribution changed over 
the period. Although peasant incomes had been raised by government policies in the early 
eighties, there is evidence that this favoured approximately 20 per cent; rural household 
differentiation appears to have been increasing. The decline of formal employment as  a 
percentage of the population, [Table 1, Row 251 suggests that the numbers relying on other 
forms of income earning have increased. Although the successive reduction and removal of 
food subsidies, aimed at  reducing the impact on the budget deficit of losses by marketing 
boards, may have helped that small percentage of farmers who are net producers of food, it 
contributed substantially to the inflation which eroded real earnings through the 1980s. 
Rows 11 and 12 show that average earnings declined relative to the poverty datum line. In 
absolute terms there were more people below the poverty line in 1990 than there were in 
1983. It thus seems that by the end of the eighties, real incomes had fallen for the majority 
of the population since 1983. 
b) Inside Factors: the Health Sector 1980-1 990 
The elitist, racist character of the health care sector in colonial Zimbabwe was one of the 
main inheritances of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980 (Loewenson and Sanders, 1988; 
Davies and Sanders. 1988). Government implemented a number of specific health-sector 
policies to tackle this inheritance, broadly adopting a primary health care (PHC) approach 
(MOH, 1984; MOH, 1986). Among the policies implemented were the integration of 
preventive with curative services; the introduction of free services for those earning less 
than $150 per month; the expansion and upgrading of health-care facilities particularly in 
rural areas; an expanded programme on immunization (ZEPI); diarrhoeal disease control 
mainly through oral rehydration therapy (ORT); the establishment of a national nutrition 
department; a village health worker and traditional midwife training programme; child 
spacing and family planning; an essential drugs programme; and a disability programme. 
In line with the PHC approach, the Ministry of Health's budget was increased and its 
internal allocation altered. Table 3 shows how the Ministry's allocation per capita grew in 
real terms until 1987 and in total until 1988. By 1988 preventive services were taking over a 
quarter of the ministry's total allocation, up from a twentieth in 1980 (this understates the 
amount going to preventive services because of the integration with curative services). There 
was also an attempt to shift expenditure away from central urban hospitals. A national 
referral hospital system was established, converting what had previously been white 
hospitals into fourth level hospitals at  the apex of a national referral system. 
Zimbabwe's record in health care has been good. Disease and mortality indicators showed 
an improvement through the 1980s, particularly when compared with the pre-independence 
situation. However, the record is not entirely one of continuous improvement. Surveying 
the outcomes of health policies in the 1980s, Davies and Sanders state: 
In summary, therefore, after substantial initial improvements, the mid-eighties saw 
stagnation and erosion of both 'outside' and 'inside' inputs to health. There are not 
yet the data to examine the net outcome of this erosion. The patchy data available up 
to the mid-eighties indicate that significant progress was made in addressing 
Zimbabwe's legacy of ill-health. Most observers agree that there has been a sharp 
decline in both IMR and U5MR since the late 1970s. For example, while the precise 
levels are not known, a review of extant studies suggests that IMR currently lies 
between 60 and 75. Levels of under nutrition appear to have declined significantly 
between 1980 and 1983/84, although there is less firm evidence of a decline 
thereafter. In 1982 a national nutrition survey of under three year-olds showed 
17.7% were underweight, 35.6% stunted (under height) and 9.1% wasted 
(significantly thin). In 1984, another national survey showed 14.5% of 1 to 5 year 
olds to be significantly under weight. However due to differing methodologies these 
two surveys are not strictly comparable. By 1988 the CS0 Demographic Health 
Survey found national levels of 11.5% underweight 29% stunted and 1.3% wasted. 
While the situation appears to have improved with respect to wasting. levels of 
stunting remain high. Once again the comparison with 1982 and 1984 data is made 
difficult because of differences in anthropometric cut-offs and the different age groups 
sampled. (Davies and Sanders, 199 1 : 12) 
They conclude that, although data are sketchy, the improvement in mortality indicators 
was accompanied by discrepantly high levels of childhood undernutrition which seem to 
have remained static or improved only marginally despite the health-care drive. This is 
attributed to the economic stagnation of the mid- and late- 1980s. 
It should also be observed that, insofar as Zimbabwe adopted PHC as an approach to health 
care, it was the selective rather than the comprehensive variant; an example of UNICEF's 
GOB1 approach, with selective targeted interventions. Furthermore, this programme relied 
heavily on external support. A World Bank study showed the main contributors to total 
health financing for 1986-87 were MOH (48.8 per cent), insurance schemes (16.5 per cent), 
foreign assistance (1 1.7 per cent) private individuals (10.0 per cent), and private firms and 
farms (8.0 per cent). These figures do not capture the full contribution made by donors and 
NGOs, whose contribution is often through donations of equipment, vehicles, drugs and 
volunteer workers. Further, the role of foreign donors was often crucial in sustaining 
specific programmes. For a time, not only vehicles but also vaccines, syringes and needles 
on ZEPI was funded by donors. In 1989, a report for the Ministry of Health, noting this and 
the intention for the MOH to gradually take over this financing, commented, "In light of the 
likely future deteriorating economic situation there must be serious doubts as to the 
feasibility of this and the future of ZEPI - surely the most successful health programme in 
independent Zimbabwe". (MOH. 1989) 
Foreign support for the health sector has also been important in terms of personnel. The 
number of registered doctors (including expatriates) increased by 13 1 ( 1 1.3 per cent) between 
1981 and 1989, despite 462 local doctors graduating in the period and an annual 
employment of about 75 expatriate doctors. Furthermore, the majority of provincial and 
district government posts were filled by expatriates (Ministry of Health, Dept of Manpower 
Planning, 1989). Expatriates thus played an import role in filling both public sector and 
rural posts that those Zimbabwean doctors who had not emigrated did not wish to fill. 
Questions have also been raised about the operational efficacy of the national referral 
system. The central hospitals, which continued to receive disproportionate public funding 
(on the grounds that they were the fourth level referral hospitals) in fact continued to be 
used as primary hospitals. (Sanders et al., 1989). 
c) Economic and Health Sector Performance under ESAP 
Zimbabwe's formal adjustment programme (ESAP) was announced in a policy statement 
(GOZ, 1990) along with the 1990 Budget and elaborated in Framework for Ecomomic 
Recovery (GOZ, 1991) in February 1991, timed for a meeting of donors in Paris. The 
programme contains components of orthodox SAPS, although there are some differences, 
mainly in the length of time over which it was to be phased. Seven main areas were targeted 
for policy reform. In what follows I outline the main intentions of the programme in each of 
these areas and briefly comment on their implementation.6 
Public Finance: the aim was to reduce the budget deficit to 5 per cent of GDP by 1994/95 
through, inter alia, eliminating subsidies to parastatals except for targeted subsidies, 
introducing fees for education, enforcing the limits for free health more effectively, 
rationalizing defence expenditure, reducing the size of the civil service and making public 
sector investments more efficient, commercializing or privatizing parastatals. The tax 
structure was to be altered to provide greater incentives for productive, and particularly 
export, activities, although it was not intended to raise tax rates. 
The Budget proposals put forward in July 1992 forecast a reduction in the deficit relative to 
GDP, but largely through cutting subsidies, fiscal drag and some new taxes, rather than 
reducing the number of civil servants. Although government claims to have retrenched 
13,000 civil servants by the end of 1992, these claims are disputed by most analysts. 
Primary school fees were introduced for urban schools in January 1992 and a wide range of 
fees have been introduced for health care. The proposal to raise the ceiling income for free 
health services from $150 per month (the level it has been since introduced in 1980) to $400 
not yet been implemented. Subsidies to parastatals have been cut, but moves to make them 
operate on more commercial lines have been slow. 
Trade liberalization and export promotion: it was proposed to dismantle the system of 
administered allocation of foreign exchange for imports over the five years of the 
programme, and to substitute it with a tariff-based system. This was to be done by 
selectively moving imports onto open general import licence. Some of the already-existing 
export incentives were to be enhanced. 
This is one of the first areas in which action was taken. However, initial implementation 
was somewhat chaotic, and there was over-importation of the first items placed on OGIL, 
largely due to speculation against further devaluation of the dollar. There has however been 
a noticeable increase in the availability of imported goods. In part this is due to the policy of 
allowing foreign exchange earned under the export retention scheme to be freely 
transferrable. It is debatable whether the policies can be regarded as "liberalizing" imports. 
since most imports competing with domestic production are still not on OGIL; the reforms 
have rather added a further category to the system for allocating foreign exchange to 
imports. There has been a large devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar [see Table 1, Row 101. 
Economic Regulation: price controls were to be removed on all save a few basic food prices. 
In the labour market collective bargaining on wages was to be extended, and the procedures 
for employers to obtain permission to fire workers streamlined. 
There has been extensive implementation in this area, with almost all price controls 
removed. 
Investment Promotion and Incentives: Government investment was to be concentrated on 
infrastructure in transport, power and telecommunications. Government was also to borrow 
to ensure supplies of capital goods. Investment and dividend repatriation regulations were 
to be streamlined. 
The maximum size for investments not requiring processing by the Zimbabwe Investment 
Centre has been raised and measures to streamline the procedures have been passed into 
law. However, there appears to have been very little investment. 
Monetary Policy and Financial Sector Reforms: Monetary policy was to be geared toward 
fighting inflation, through managed interest rate and credit policies. 
Interest rates have risen substantially, following the policy of keeping them positive in real 
terms. Tight monetary policies have also been implemented, with many firms facing a credit 
squeeze. 
Social Aspects of Adjustment: a "social fund" was established as the basis for protecting 
"vulnerable segments of the society", through targeted subsidies and the promotion of 
employment, especially in the informal sector (GOZ, 1990: 19). 
Although a fund has been established, its initial capital of $20 million was derisory and 
little action appears to have been taken to protect vulnerable groups. The policy of 
exempting the very poor from some of the newly introduced education and health fees has 
largely been ineffective because of the bureaucratic procedures required in order to qualify. 
Financing of the Economic Adjustment Programme: it was recognized that the programme 
would require external funding. 
Donors at the Paris meeting in April 1991 agreed to shift previously promised project aid 
into quicker disbursing programme aid. There has also been a large inflow of new donor 
money, largely related to drought assistance. As Rows 13 to 16 of Table 1 shows, Central 
Government foreign debt grew fi-om 3 1.9 per cent to 41.3 per cent of GDP between 1990 and 
1991. 
Assessment of ESAP at this stage must be tentative, since data is not yet available and the 
drought complicates matters. However, there seems little doubt that the immediate impact 
has been negative for most Zimbabweans. 
Inflation was the most immediately visible result of ESAP. Between July 1990 and October 
1992 (latest figures), the low income CPI rose by 106 per cent; the food component rose by 
116 per cent. Constant price average earnings in the formal sector fell by 12.5 per cent in 
1991, and by slightly more relative to the poverty datum line. A survey of a high density 
suburb in Harare suggests that the households below the poverty line rose from 23 per cent 
in 1991 to 43 per cent in 1992 (Kanji, 1993). Employment rose by 4.2 per cent in the same 
year, mainly in agriculture, manufacturing and distribution. 
Expenditure in the Ministry of Health has declined significantly in real terms. Although the 
total allocation increased by 13 per cent in 1990, it declined by 15 per cent in 199 1 and 13 
per cent in 1992. In per capita terms this decline was greater; in the 1992193 budget 
planned expenditure was $1 2.26 per head in constant 1980 dollars, compared with $18.35 
in the 19901 91 budget. 
A major policy of ESAP in the health sector has been cost recovery in the form of fees for 
public health-care services. By 1992, the income for those qualifying for free health was 20 
per cent of the urban PDL for a family of five. Several studies have shown that there has 
been a sharp rise in maternal deaths since 1989. "Nationally the number (of maternal 
deaths) increased by 88 per cent between 1989 and 1990 and then by 27 per cent between 
1990 and 199 1. National maternal mortality rate increased by 39 per cent from 25 1 deaths 
per 100 000 total births in the whole of 1991 to 350 deaths per 100 000 between January 
and June 1992." (Chisvo, 1992: 9) There have been similar increases in admission and 
death rates of babies born before arrival. These appear "to be closely linked with the 
introduction of health charges and the application of strict criteria for exemption. The drop 
in utilization of health facilities after cost recovery measures was also evident from data 
collected under the Ministry of Health Essential Drugs Action Programme from 21 Primary 
Health Care Facilities countrywide. The statistics collected for a three month period, March 
to June, 1991, showed that the average case load dropped by 25 per cent at these facilities 
over the three months due to cost recovery." (Chisvo, 1992: 9). Similar reductions in 
utilization rates have been noted by Renfrew (Renfrew, 1992). 
In fact, except for those earning less than $150 per month, there had been fees throughout 
the 1980s, although these had not been rigorously implemented. Furthermore, the erosion 
of the free service through inflation meant that whereas in 1980 the ceiling was 137 per 
cent of the PDL for urban families of five, by 1990 it was 40 per cent. Furthermore, in the 
late 1980s, prior to ESAP, medical officials were being exhorted by the Ministry of Health to 
implement the procedures for exemption more rigorously. Thus, the gains that had been 
made in the early eighties had been eroded before ESAP was formally introduced. 
4 Structural Adjustment, Health Care and Health: Some Lessons from Zimbabwe 
Although the data are sketchy, there seems little doubt that the immediate impact of ESAP 
in Zimbabwe has been to cause a serious deterioration in living standards for a large number 
of middle and low income households. Evidence suggests that this has had a negative effect 
on health care provision, on the utilization of health care services and on mortality 
indicators. This experience, combined with perceptions of the effects of SAPS elsewhere in 
Africa, have rightly provoked a number of criticisms in Zimbabwe. Thus MacGarry lists the 
potentid winners and losers from ESAP: 
Winners: 
1 International bankers they collect on 
our debts. 
2 Multinational corporations: . they own 
our industries and control the markets 
through which we try to sell our 
products. 
3 Our commercial farmers: marketing and 
transport services will be concentrated 
on serving them under "cost-cutting" 
proposals. 
Losers: 
1 Landless unemployed: ESAP offers them 
nothing. 
2 Ordinary workers: ESAP offers them 
lower wages, less security and higher 
prices for the necessities of life. 
3 Peasant farmers: cutting allegedly 
"unprofitable" services means their crop 
marketing depots will close and their 
roads will deteriorate so they cannot get 
produce to market. (MacGarry, 1993: 
31) 
Father Peter Balleis, in his foreword to Renfrew's pamphlet says, "The increase and new 
introduction of medical fees in hospitals and clinics is part of cost-recovery under ESAP. It 
directly affects the life and health of the majority of poor people in Zimbabwe. The decline in 
the health standard of the people is not just due to medical fees but also to the general 
decline in real income ... For the sake of peoples' health and life and for long term economic 
growth health care must remain a political and economic priority as it used to be in the 
programme of the 80s." (Balleis, in Renfiew, 1992). 
These writers, like other more radical critics of SAPS, thus not only clearly attribute the 
decline in real incomes and health care to ESAP, but also see it as undermining a successful 
pre-ESAP system. In this final section I wish to raise a number of points which need to bz 
taken into account in making such a judgement. Firstly, by rejecting not only ESAP as a 
package, but all of the components of that package individually, I believe that the critics 
allow the proponents of ESAP to determine the agenda for debate. It is clear to any 
Zimbabwean or observer of Zimbabwe that there was a need for policy reforms of some 
nature. Many of the components of ESAP are economic policy instruments which need to be 
used to manage the economy. One should not allow them to be removed from the policy 
tool-kit simply because they are misused elsewhere, Thus, to take the most demonized, it 
seems to me that cost-recovery in health not only is necessary when resources are 
constrained, but can also be arranged so as to increase equity in the access to health care.7 
Secondly, I do not agree that one can portray the economic policies followed since 1983 as 
successful in sustaining incomes and health status, or in promoting sustainable equity. 
Despite policy statements to the contrary, it is apparent that prior to the introduction of 
ESAP not only had average incomes stagnated but also that distribution had worsened. For 
the poor in Zimbabwe, the late 1980s saw a decline in the quality and quantity of most 
services - education, transport, housing, health - publicly provided to the poor. The 
wealthy increasingly protected themselves by leaving the public schooling system for private 
schools, relying on private cars rather than buses, used private rather than public medical 
services and bought private houses. 
Furthermore, I think it is incorrect to argue that health-sector policies in the 1980s were 
adequate. The gains made in the early 1980s were substantially eroded by the end of the 
decade. It is not clear that the public health-care system was achieving the objectives set 
out in PHC-oriented policy statements. I have already noted that those aspects of policies 
which contributed to the improvements in mortality and morbidity indicators were based on 
selective interventions and relied on substantial foreign assistance. It is not correct to 
portray them as following what Wisner has called strong comprehensive PHC (Wisner, 
1988). The central element of the PHC approach is participation by local communities in 
deciding what their health needs are. The health system in Zimbabwe did not adopt this 
approach,* The system remains one in which "experts" impose an external definition of 
need on a community, in which local organizations are seen as important instruments for 
the delivery of health care information and technology, rather than as transformative 
institutions. On the contrary, as David Sanders has argued, the central government acted 
soon after independence to destroy those incipient autonomous health organizations 
which had developed during the liberation war. 
I would argue therefore that one cannot see the formal ESAP as  the fons et origo of the 
decline in living standards in general and health-care provision in particular. The origins 
are to be found in policies followed earlier, which had cumulatively contributed to the 
unsustainability of initial welfare gains. 
Some critics of ESAP do indeed trace the problems back to 1982-84, when Zimbabwe first 
flirted with the IMF and the World Bank first began to become involved in economic policy. 
However, these criticisms play down the relevance of macro-economic resource constraints. 
Part of the reason why Zimbabwe has embarked upon a programme which undermines its 
earlier welfare gains - in fact has been on such a programme since 1983 - is that it did not 
pay sufficient attention to this constraint when implementing these programmes in the 
post-independence period. I t  is tautological that a country can only use more goods and 
services (for current consumption and investment by the public and the private sector) than 
it produces if it is able to borrow, i.e. persuade foreigners to let it use some of their goods and 
services. One can (and should) argue that the international economic system should 
transfer more resources to the third world. But achieving this is neither a short-run 
solution nor one that is part of the range of policy instruments available to the Zimbabwean 
government. In these circumstances, attention has to be paid to the overall resource 
constraints, and arguing that there is a moral obligation to provide adequate incomes and 
access to health for all, as a basic human right, does not circumvent the constraint. 
Zimbabwe's early policies set up programmes that required either borrowing or growth in 
order to be sustained. Furthermore, much of its borrowing, both domestic and foreign, did 
not go in adequate quantities into growth promotion. Once government decided, in 1982, 
that the debt implications of the then levels of foreign borrowing were unacceptable, and 
used quantitative controls to compress imports, it started on the path to ESAP. On trade 
policy, as Davies and Rattso ( 1993) have argued, it was increasingly faced by a trade-off 
between domestic production levels and investment. On the budget deficit, when faced with 
constraining expenditure it tended to cut investment rather than recurrent expenditure, 
reducing the crowding-in effects on private investment. 
To understand why this happened, one has to consider the political economy of the state in 
Zimbabwe. The initial welfare programmes, based as they were on optimistic expectations of 
what was possible, were in some sense understandable. No government that had achieved 
state power after the liberation war could have survived for long without satisfying some of 
the expectations of the Zimbabwean people. However, while the policies did expand access 
for many Zimbabweans, there was little institutional reform to change the structure of the 
economy.9 What were essentially income redistributing measures substituted for wealth 
and ownership redistribution. The perceived constraints of the Lancaster House 
constitution and the threat of South African intervention to prevent radical 
transformation, were used to justify this. However, as I have argued elsewhere, it is difficult 
to sustain the argument that institutional reforms were operating on the frontier imposed 
by these constraints (Davies, 1988). 
Once the state accepted this approach to redressing the past, I would argue that it moved 
along a path of convergence with private capital. As  political leaders and senior state 
functionaries accumulated private wealth, using their state positions, so their concern for 
radical redistribution of wealth receded. 10 
Does the above argument mean that ESAP should be exonerated? I believe not. There are 
fundamental problems with both the design and the implementation of the current reforms. 
At the economic level, ESAP proceeds on the premise that because previous state 
interventions have been harmful, there should be no intervention. The case against proper 
selective intervention to promote industrialization has not been proved theoretically or 
empirically. Similarly, ESAP still relies on the stagnationist elements of earlier stabilization 
policies; demand deflation coupled with a failure to recognize the elements of cost push 
inflation. In its implementation of the programme, the excessive reliance on restrictive 
monetary policy, particularly given continuing government deficits and inflows of foreign 
assistance, has severely restricted the ability of fnms to respond to any positive shift in 
production incentives that might have occurred. 
On the social front, Zimbabwe's ESAP suffers from similar problems to other SAPs: policies to 
"mitigate the effects on vulnerable groups" are being introduced too late. It is not yet clear 
whether in fact government has designed any such policies, so that, even if they could 
reduce social costs, their introduction will be too late. 
As suggested in the earlier discussion of SAPs, one's assessment depends crucially on 
whether growth rates are significantly raised in the long run. In Zimbabwe's case, it is not at 
all clear that any growth which might come out of the current programme will be sufficient 
to compensate for the short-term costs. It is clear that foreign debt will be substantially 
higher at the end of the programme than it was at the start; it is not yet clear that her 
production and exports will be. In addition, even if there is growth, it is unlikely that the 
distribution of the benefits will be adequate to satisfy even a conventional economist's 
criteria for a welfare improvement. 
In addition to these criticisms, the ESAP is based on a flawed paradigm; a non-structural 
view of market systems. As with the advice being given by some western economists to 
reformers in the former Soviet bloc, there is an underlying presupposition that all that is 
needed for markets to work is that agents should be freed of any regulation on the pursuit 
of their own self interest. This confuses the notion of a market with that of a market 
system. Even if it is true that individual agents might seek to do the best they can when 
dealing with other agents, this does not mean that resources will be allocated within the 
economy according to "market principles". The existence of institutions and infrastructure 
integrating fragmented markets, the creation of "free" labour and competition amongst 
capitals are all pre-requisites for this to happen. The role of the state in creating these 
capitalist institutions historically is denied by orthodox structural adjusters. Rather than 
creating these, the freeing of "market forces" will allow a private, oligopolistic, mercantilist 
and rentier class to substitute for a mercantilist state. 
Specifically referring to cost recovery measures in health, it should be noted that these do 
not create a market in the health sector. The "prices" are administered and do not perform 
fully the functions that prices are supposed to play. Rather they are a tax. The allocation of 
resources within the health-care sector remains a bureaucratic process; there is not a sense 
in which prices can act as signals to bureaucrats, indicating "consumer preferences". 
To return to the opponents of ESAP in Zimbabwe. Their focus on the short-run costs, and 
their failure to recognize the problems entailed in pre-ESAP policies, leads them away fi-om 
the basic problem underlying both sets of policies: the underdeveloped nature of civil society 
in Zimbabwe. Wisner observes that "The chief danger of selective primary health care, is that 
it helps to slow or to divert the growth of local organizations capable of articulating these 
demands for change at an historical turning point that can only lead to change or to 
disaster." (Wisner, 1988: 968) This criticism can be generalized to Zimbabwe in the 1980s. 
The nature of its political processes blocked the growth of such organizations in most 
spheres of life. A pervasive state privileged itself to articulate these demands on behalf of 
"the people"; where this privilege was not recognized, it acted to suppress autonomous 
articulation. Thus while the problems are perceived as economic, and have important 
economic dimensions implications, the underlying causes are political. It is not clear that 
ESAP addresses these causes, particularly in an economy characterized by inequalities. 
I believe that this observation is relevant also for the more radical opponents of ESAP. The 
changes to the global economy which they argue are necessary before third-world poverty 
can be addressed will surely only come about when the people of the third world are able to 
"articulate these demands for change". 
NOTES 
Currently visiting Department of Economics, School of Oriental and African Studies, 
University of London. This paper has been written in London, where it has been difficult 
to obtain up-to date information on Zimbabwe. I would like to thank Sara Davies, Colin 
Stoneman and Carol Thompson for help in filling some of the gaps. 
This is the thrust of much of the work on adjustment coming from UNICEF (see Cornia 
et a1 1987, 1992). One can find similar views in some World Bank publications (World 
Bank, 1990). 
See for example Kanji et a1 (1991) for a cogent statement of this critique. 
These matters have been more extensively reviewed in, inter alia, Davies and Rattsa 
( 1993) and Shaw and Davies ( 1989). 
In practice it introduced a relatively mild form of welfarism through redistribution: the 
policy statement, Growth with Equity (GOZ, 198 1) is hardly a milestone in socialist 
literature. An assessment of the socialist content of government programmes can be 
found in Davies (1  988). 
This is not intended as a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of the 
programme to date but rather focuses on those aspects most relevant for this paper. 
We should perhaps note that there has always been an element of cost recovery in the 
health-care system in Zimbabwe: a substantial, fee-paying private health care system 
caters for the rich. A comprehensive public system, which collected the same fees from 
the same people, would surely be more equitable. 
It is perhaps (im)pertinent to note that even the government statements declaring PHC 
as a policy were drafted with a large input from foreign consultants. They did not reflect 
an organic outgrowth from political processes involving the disempowered people of 
Zirnbabwe. 
9 For example, the early (and limited) land resettlement programme was one of the first 
victims of government expenditure restrictions in 1983. Land reform was seen as a 
political rather than an economic measure. 
10 I would suggest as a plausible hypothesis (although I am not sure how one would test 
it) that this accumulation was initially through rent-seeking - essentially accumulation 
through redistribution. However, as it proceeded so interest has shifted to accumulation 
through production; hence the willingness of policy-makers to move from mercantilist to 
laissez faire policies. 
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TABLE 1: GENERAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
POPULATION 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (Factor Cost) 
Current Prices (S million) 
Constant 1980 Prices (S million) 
Per Capita Current Prices (S1 
Per Capita Constant 1980 Prices (S1 
GROSS flXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
Current Prices (S miilion) 
Constant 1980 Prices [S Million) 
Share of GDP Current Prices 
Shore of GDP Constant Prices 
EXCHANGE RATE: Z$1 = US$ 
NET BARTER TERMS OF TRADE 
INCOME TERMS OF TRADE 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FOREIGN DEBT 
Total Foreign Debt [S] 
Total Foreign Debt [US$] 
As percent of GDP 
Share of Foreign Debt in Total Debt 
AVERAGE EARNINGS 
Current prices (S] 
Constant Output Prices ($1 
Constant Consumer Prices ($1 
POVERTY DATUM UNE 
Family of 5 
Famiiyof 7 
AVERAGE EARNINGS AS PROPORTION OF 
EMPlOYMENT 
Total Formal Employment ('000) 
Total as Shore of Population 
INFLATION 
GDP Deflator 
Lower Income CPi 
Lower Income Food Inflation 
17.0 19.1 20.9 19.0 17.6 18.1 17.4 17.3 18.3 17.9 18.6 16.2 no 
12.9 14.5 15.9 14.4 13.2 13.6 13.2 13.1 13.7 13.4 .13.9 12.1 no 
t 
5 
z 
a 
b 
b 
b 
b 
b 
b 
c 
c 
d 
b 
e 
b 
f 
g 
e 
e 
h 
i 
j 
j 
POVERTY 
SOURCES AND NOTES a) CSO(1988a): ElU (1 993) 
b) CS0 (198813): CS0 (1992) 
c) calculated from Rows 2.3.6 and 7 
d) Reserve &mk Quarterly &Illetin (various dates) 
e) estimated from CS0 (19880): CS0 (1991) 
fl calculated from Rows 10 and 13 
g) calculated from Rows 2 and 13 
h) calculated by deflating Row 17 by GDP deflotor 
i) calculated by deflating Row 17 by Higher lncome Consumer Price Index 
j) estimated by inflating 1978 PDL (Cubbitt, 1979) by relevant Low lncome CPI 
k) calculated from Rows 17.20 and 21 
i) calculated from Rows 1 and 24 
m) calculated from Rows 2 and 3 
n) estimated from CPI for Lower lncome Urban Families: 
1992 = inflation between October 1991 and October 1992 
b 
1 
m 
n 
n 
1010 1038'1046 1033 1036 1055 1081 1085 1131 1167 1192 1243 no 
13.7 13.7 13.7 13.4 13.0 12.9 12.9 12.6 12.7 12.8 12.7 12.9 na 
10 14 13 21 2 7 12 9 18 12 19 26 na 
5 13 1 1  23 20 8 14 12 7 13 17 2 4 5 3  
4 12 11 29 24 7 13 15 9 14 18 2 5 6 5  
1980 1981 1982 1983 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1W2 
7.36 7.6 7.61 7.73 7.95 8.17 8.41 8.64 8.88 9.12 9.37 9.6 10.4 
3224 4049 4657 5432 5649 6503 7408 8019 10183 11903 1449419013 no 
3224 3537 3588 5459 3540 3803 3881 3833 4143 4332 M25 4587 na 
438 533 612 703 711 796 881 928 1147 1305 1547 1981 no 
438 465 471 447 445 465 461 444 467 475 472 478 no 
528 830 1039 1238 1185 1133 1312 1673 2031 2350 na no no 
528 722 788 765 618 505 518 601 686 750 na no na 
16.4 20.5 22.3 22.8 21.0 17.4 17.7 20.9 19.9 19.7 na no na 
16.4 20.4 22.0 22.1 17.5 13.3 13.3 15.7 16.6 17.3 na na no 
0.63 0.72 0.92 1.1  1 1.50 1.64 1.68 1.66 1.94 2.27 2.45 3.43 5.42 
ICO 111 108 104 121 123 120 106 
l m  107 107 109 122 129 149 143 
415 514 841 987 1438 1829 2223 2184 3099 3554 4618 7854 na 
658 717 915 892 957 1114 1325 1313 1595 1566 1886 2291 no 
12.9 12.7 18.1 18.2 25.5 28.1 30.0 27.2 30.4 29.9 31.9 41.3 na 
22.5 24.5 33.9 34.6 38.4 39.4 40.8 36.1 39.0 37.7 40.8 52.2 no 
1863 2307 2789 3067 3358 3771 4160 4631 5205 5776 7040 7617 no 
1863 2016 2149 1954 2104 2205 2179 2228 2118 2102 2149 1839 na 
1863 2027 2138 1965 1851 1903 1839 1830 1921 IS02 2014 1761 no 
1W 121 133 161 191 208 239 267 285 323 379 470 736 
144 159 175 213 254 277 316 355 380 430 506 627 996 
DATUM UNE 
l 
TABLE 2: HEALTH SECTOR INDICATORS 
TABLE 3: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET ALLOCATIONS TO HEALTH 
1980 1981 l982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1969 19FO 1991 1992 
15.2 16.3 18.9 19.0 19.9 19.7 21.8 22.0 22.8 23.6 25.0 26.5 no 
lW.O 107.9 120.5 121.3 124.7 147.4 164.0 185.9 206.5 232.7 306.9 375.8 540 
no 8 12 1 3 18 11 13 11 13 32 22 44 
137 124 'l2 93 79 72 63 40 32 20 
71 82 l06 108 116 143 164 184 221 256 356 481 no 
71 76 88 69 93 97 103 99 107 110 116 128 no 
10 11 14 14 15 18 20 21 25 28 38 5 0 n o  
10 10 12 12 12 12 12 11 12 12 l2 13 no 
2.2 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 na 
2.2 2.1 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.8 no 
3197 3417 4011 4aX) 4558 5440 5961 6427 7171 8322 1055610883 na 
3197 2985 3091 2549 2856 3181 3123 3092. 2918 3029 3223 2627 no 
3197 3W1 3074 2563 2512 2745 2635 2540 2646 2751 3020 2516 na 
172 148 144 130 136 144 143 139 138 144 150 143 no 
68 68 72 70 78 75 79 77 74 77 74 60 no 
SOURCES AND NOTES a) CS0 (19880): (1991) 
b) Delator used for Health Sector in GDP estimates: calculated from Rows 4 & 5: 
1992 value estimated using regression of health deflator and Cpl. 
C) calculated from Row 2 
d) estimated by dividing Table 1. Row 20 by  150 
e) calculated from Row 4 and Table 1. Row 1 
0 calculated from Row 5 and Table 1, Row 1 
g) calculated from Row 8 and Table 1. Row 2 
h) calculated from Row 9 and Table I. Row 3 
i) estimated by deflating Row 11 by GDP deflator 
j) estimoted by deflating Row 11 by Higher Income Consumer Price Index 
k) calculated from Row 11 and Table 1, Row 17 
I) calculated from Rows 1.5 and 1 1 
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1980 1981 1982 l983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1WO 1991 1992 
84 109 132 139 159 1% 241 293 328 353 528 549 689 
3 4 6 5 5 14 12 l4 12 16 na 14 20 
75 % 107 114 131 154 196 231 260 284 na 466557 
6 8 17 19 22 27 32 47 54 51 na 67109 
1 1  1 1  1 1 . 1  2 2 2 n a 3 3  
mlllion) 
84 l01 109 115 128 133 147 157 159 152 172 l46 128 
3 4 5 4 4 1 0 7 7 6 7 1 x 3 4 4  
75 69 69 94 105 104 119 124 126 122 na 124 103 
6 8 14 16 I8 I9 19 25 26 22 na 18 20 
1 1  1 1  1 1  1 1  1 I n a l l  
21 8 5 12 4 10 7 1 -5 13 -15 -13 
ia, ~a, i m ia, ]a, IKJ lm ICO ICU IW ICU 
c 3 4 5 4 3 7 5 5 4 4 0 3 3  
89 88 82 82 82 78 81 79 79 81 0 85 81 
7 8 13 14 14 14 13 16 16 14 0 12 16 
1 1 1 1 1 1 l . 1  1 0 1 0  
11.38 14.33 17.30 17.98 20.05 24.02 28.61 33.86 3694 38.69 56.31 57.23 66.22 
10.18 12.61 14.11 14.70 16.47 18.80 23.26 26.69 29.26 31.15 na 48.50 53.53 
0.76 1.11 2.26 2.47 2.80 3.34 3.79 5.39 6.08 5.57 n o  6.9310.45 
11.38 13.28 14.37 14.82 16.07 16.29 17.44 18.22 1788 16.63 18.35 15.23 12.26 
10.18 11.68 11.72 12.11 13.20 12.75 14.18 14.36 14.16 13.39 0.m 12.91 9.91 
0.76 1.03 1.88 2.03 2.24 2.27 2.31 2.m 2.94 2.39 0.W I.@ 1.94 
n o  16.8 8.1 3.1 8.5 1A 7.1 4.4 -1.8 -7.0 10.4 -17.0 -19.5 
HEALTH SECTOR EMPLOYMENT ('000) 
HEALTH SECTOR DEFLATOR 
INFLATION INTHE HEALTH SEClOR (X )  
CEIUNGFORFREE HEALTHASXOFPDL 
VALUE ADDED IN HEALTH SECTOR 
Current Prices (S million) 
Constant 1980 Prices (S million) 
Per Capita Current Prices ($1 
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SHARE IN GDP 
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Constant Prices: 
AVERAGE EARNINGS 
Current prices (S) 
Constant Output Prices ($1 
Constant Consumer Prices ($1 
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to Average Earnings in the Economy 
SHARE OF EARNINGS IN 
VALUE ADDED (M 
SOURCES AND NOTES a) GO2 (various dates) 
b) Rows I to 5 deflated by  Table 2. Row 2 
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Administration 
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